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In	this	paper,	 the	patent	system	will	be	briefly	reviewed	and	some	particular	problems	in	designing	and	using	it	
will	be	considered	within	the	broad	framework	of	the	rela-
tionships	between	patent	 and	 innovation.	The	bulk	of	 the	
argument	 is	 that	 economists	 typically	 consider	 the	patent	
system	as	a	necessary	evil:	innovation	will	benefit	from	the	
incentive	 created	 by	 a	 patent	 but	 it	may	 suffer	 if	 patents	
discourage	 the	 combining	 and	 recombining	 of	 inventions	









of	 technical	 advances	 as	 an	 important	 factor	 determining	
the	relation	between	patent	and	innovation.	Part	2	reviews	











be	clear	 that	 the	patent	 system	 is	only	one	option	among	
others,	 as	peculiar	ways	 to	 solve	 the	 tension	between	 the	
maximization	of	inventor’s	private	interests	and	the	socially	
optimal	 use	 of	 knowledge.	 The	 theoretical	 option	 taken	










On the economic fundamentals  
of the patent system
imperfect appropriabiLity
The	 initial	 step	 in	 constructing	 a	 rationale	 in	 the	 domain	
of	patent	involves	the	classical	source	of	market	failures	as	
analysed	 in	Arrow	 (1962)	 and	 in	 the	 following	 literature.	
This	 approach	 focuses	 attention	 upon	 the	 special	 charac-
teristics	of	knowledge	as	an	economic	commodity,	which	
will	 be	 seen	 to	 affect	 its	 generation	 and	 distribution.	As	
Rockett	did	in	a	very	recent	survey	(2009),	let	do	an	intel-
lectual	 experiment	 (which	 actually	 has	 some	 historical	






pliers	 of	 the	 innovative	product	 or	 process,	 driving	down	
its	price	and	so	the	profits	of	the	original	innovator.	If	the	
process	 is	quick	or	very	cheap,	 then	very	 little	 surplus	 is	
captured	by	the	initial	 innovator.	Any	innovator	anticipat-
ing	this	process	will	not	invest	in	the	innovation	in	the	first	










even	 though	 the	 underlying	 knowledge	 remains	 a	 public	
good.




ena	 which,	 naturally	 or	 intentionally,	 lessen	 the	 problem	
(Foray,	2006).	
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quaLification of the argument: imperfect  
appropriabiLity does not appLy any time and  
everywhere and is not aLways a probLem
“Imperfect	appropriability”	theory	treats	only	one	extreme	
case,	knowledge,	expressed	 in	an	appropriate	form	for	 its	































controlling	 access	 to	 new	 knowledge,	 thereby	 lessening	
the	 appropriability	 problem.	 Imitation	 is	 a	 process	which	
is	costly	and	may	take	a	long	time.	On	this	base	being first 
in inventing a new knowledge may	be	sufficient	in	certain	
cases	to	capture	a	good	fraction	of	the	benefits.	In	fact	the	
supply	of	 copies	 cannot	 instantly	 undergo	 infinite	 expan-
sion.	Hence	the	fact	of	being	first	is	an	asset	that	can	com-
mand	a	positive	price	under	competitive	conditions.	












Finally,	 even	 if	 imperfect	 appropriability	 remains	 an	
important	 problem,	 other	 sources	 of	 profit	 for	 innovators	
than	the	monopoly	rent	can	undermine	the	severity	of	the	
problem,	(Hirshleifer,	1971).	By	definition,	innovators	are	








In	 all	 these	 cases	 the	 question	 of	maintaining	 control	










designing incentives is difficuLt since two things have 




for	 the	design	of	 instruments	 to	help	 to	correct	 imperfect	
appropriability	 is	 that	 helping	 innovators	 and	 knowledge	
producers	to	get	a	better	control	on	the	innovation	in	order	
to	 capture	 a	 significant	 fraction	 of	 the	 benefits	 stemming	
from	their	R&D	investments	and	creative	efforts	is	only	one	
part	of	the	policy	problem.	The	other	part	is	about	maximiz-
ing	 access	 and	 spillovers	 so	 that	 the	 society	will	 quickly	
benefit	from	the	new	knowledge	which	has	been	produced.	




efficiency	 and	 growth	 are	 promoted	 by	 the	 rapidity	with	
which	new	knowledge	and	new	technologies	are	dissemi-
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program,	but	finds	that	other	firms	rapidly	share	in	the	fruits,	
why	should	that	firm	devote	time,	effort	and	funding	to	con-
tinue	 that	program?	To	 summarize	 rapid	dissemination	 is	
good	for	social	well-being	but	bad	for	private	 returns:	no	
one	wants	to	invest	in	the	creation	of	new	knowledge	if	free	
sharing	 and	 dissemination	 occur	 rapidly.	This	 is	 the	 eco-
nomic	 (or	knowledge)	 trade	off	between	 the	need	 for	 the	
knowledge	producer	to	capture	some	of	the	benefits	asso-










for	 access	excludes	 some	would-be	consumers,	 the	 result	
is	waste.	Wants	go	unsatisfied	that	could	have	been	satis-
fied	 at	 no	 cost.	 However,	 in	 a	 dynamic world	 (in	 which	
knowledge	needs	to	be	produced),	the	knowledge	producers	
want	their	costs	to	be	covered	and	seek	for	economic	rents:	












knowledge	 producer	 to	 capture	 the	 benefits	 of	 his	 effort;	





patents: a mechanism devised “to do the two things”
Among	 these	 institutions,	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 and	










Patent	 is	 one	 of	 the	 rights	 granted	 to	 the	 creators	 of	
intellectual	 products.	 Ideas	 are,	 of	 course,	 recognized	 as	
being	part	of	humanity’s	 common	base	and	 therefore	not	
appropriable	by	a	private	person.	 In	 this	 respect,	 they	are	
outside	 the	 law.	A	 literary	 subject,	 an	 artistic	principle,	 a	
political	idea,	or	a	scientific	vision,	for	example,	cannot	be	
monopolized.	What	can	however	tilt	over	into	private	prop-
erty	 is	 the	 concretization	 of	 the	 idea,	 theme	or	 principle.	
Only	then	may	it	be	the	object	of	a	private	right.
In	exchange	for	patent	rights	the	inventor	must	publicly	





that	 other	 people	 can	 use	 the	 knowledge	 which	 is	 made	















But	 the	 economic	 function	 of	 patents	 is	 not	 just	 to	
reward	 invention,	but	 to	provide	a	 secure	economic	envi-
ronment	 for	 the	 investment	 that	 converts	 ideas	 in	 reality	
(Jaffe,	2005).	This	“D”	part	of	R&D	 is	expensive,	 and	 is	
often	carried	out	most	effectively	in	the	private	sector.	Thus	







1.	 The	 fact	 that	 marginal	 cost	 of	 reproduction	 is	 zero	 is	 essentially	
due	to	the	fact	that	knowledge,	once	produced,	is	not	destroyed	by	use	
and	 consumption.	 Its	 benefits	 can	 be	 enjoyed	 undiminished	 by	many	




cost.	 For	 example,	 to	 be	 used	 effectively	 knowledge	 needs	 educated	
people.
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the unanticipated effects of patents on innovation in 
“compLex technoLogy” situations
Patent	 is	 likely	 to	encourage	 innovation	 (above).	But	 this	
relation	 is	 not	 so	 simple;	 it	 is	 depending	on	 the	 topogra-
phy	of	technical	advance	in	a	field,	in	particular	how	inven-
tions	are	 linked	 to	each	other,	 and	 in	 the	extent	 to	which	






ars	mean	one	 in	which	 today’s	advances	 lay	 the	basis	for	
tomorrow’s,	which	 in	 turn	 lay	 the	basis	 for	a	next	 round,	
etc..Innovative	 cumulativeness	 has	 implications	 both	 for	
the	social	value	of	discoveries	and	for	the	ease	with	which	
firms	 can	 be	 given	 incentives	 to	 create	 them.	 The	 social	




firms	will	 have	 incentive	 to	 innovate.	This	 is	 particularly	
true	when	future	innovations	are	improved	versions	of	pre-
vious	 innovations.	Later	products	can	supplant	 the	earlier	
products	 in	 the	market,	 thus	 terminating	 the	 profitability	
of	 the	 products	 that	 facilitated	 them.	 In	 that	 case,	 there	
may	be	 too	 little	 incentive	 to	provide	 the	earlier	products	
(Scotchmer,	1991).




tems	 is	defined	broadly,	 the	holder	of	 that	patent	may	be	
able	 to	block	others	 from	commercializing	 those	 systems	




One	of	 the	main	 themes	 to	 emerge	 is	 that	firms	have	
powerful	economic	incentives	to	resolve	this	kind	of	con-
flicts	 in	 intellectual	 property	 rights	 caused	 by	 the	 com-
plexity	 of	 relationships	 between	 patent	 and	 cumulative	
or	 system’s	 technologies	 through	 contracting,	 either	with	
research	 joint	 ventures	 or	 licensing.	 Cross-licensing	 and	




On costs, benefits and different classes of effects: 
theory and empirical evidence
costs and benefits (private and sociaL point of views)
The	 patent	 system	 has	many	 virtues.	The	most	 visible	 is	
in	 its	main	role	which	 is	 to	provide	an	 incentive	(an	eco-
nomic	 motivation)	 to	 future	 inventors.	 Patent	 is	 a	 legal	
device	which	is	generally	defined	as	a	right	to	exclude.	It	
ensures	inventors	the	right	to	a	temporary	“monopoly”	on	
a	 technical	 invention	 for	a	certain	period	of	 time.	During	













other	 classes	 of	 “intangibles”	 cannot	 be	 used	 for	 proper	
evaluation.
Finally	 the	patent	 system	as	a	 reward	mechanism	has	
some	virtue	in	terms	of	the	whole	management	of	the	sys-




































some	 industries	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 patent	 applica-
tions	is	explained	not	by	the	need	to	protect	more	innova-






Given	 both	 advantages	 and	 shortcomings,	 the	 pat-









obvious	 and	 well-known.	 However,	 they	 were	 ill-treated	
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a	fair	balance	between	the	inventor’s	private	interests	and	






patent excess in the knowLedge economy and the new 
questions raised by economists
The	 concern	 just	mentioned	 deals	with	 some	 inappropri-
ate	modes	of	use	of	patents,	 from	a	 social	point	of	view.	





because	 each	 knows	 that	 the	 defendant	 would	 respond	
with	a	counterattack	based	on	those	of	the	defendant’s	pat-
ents	 that	 it	 itself	 is	 infringing.	Litigation	is	 too	much	like	
a	nuclear	weapon,	and	the	relation	becomes	one	mutually	
assured	destruction!	Each	firm	must	therefore	maintain	an	
IP	 portfolio	 for	 bargaining-chip,	 i.e.	 defensive,	 purposes.	








little	 to	 do	 with	 protecting	 innovation	 while	 increasing	
asymmetric	powers	in	bargaining	and	negotiation	between	
the	big	and	the	small	players:	“I just don’t know what is in 













It	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 the	 new	 situation	 involving	 inten-











What	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 is	 that	 it	 is	 (was?)	
relatively	 easy	 to	 get	 a	 large	 number	 of	 patents	 granted	
or	patents	 including	a	high	number	of	claims	while	 these	
applications	 do	 not	 strictly	 aim	 at	 protecting	 correspond-













granted	 and	 the	 role	 of	 economic	 incentives	 as	 shaping	
behaviors	and	strategies	both	of	the	private	innovators	and	
of	the	patent	office.	Such	questions	became	quite	central	as	
economists	 started	 to	 clearly	 see	 that	 some	other	mecha-
nisms	may	do	a	better	 job,	supporting	innovation	without	
creating	 exclusivity	 and	monopoly.	 For	 instance,	 we	 can	
observe	the	current	booming	of	some	social	systems	–	such	















acterized	 by	 lax	 standards	 for	 enablement	 and	 disclosure	
(something	like	a	shift	from	literal	description	in	rigourous	
terms	as	“direction	of	use”	which	allows	for	effective	repro-








ment	 of	 applications	 in	 the	 new	fields.	As	Barton	 (2007)	
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patent, innovation and competition








both	 causal	 chains	 –	 patent stimulates innovation and 
competition stimulates innovation	-	need	to	be	adequately	
combined	 in	 order	 to	 promote	 dynamic	 competition.	As	
a	consequence,	 the	patent	 law	 itself	 is	 in	need	of	a	“pro-













new	 firms	 with	 limited	 assets.	 Second,	 a	 negative	 effect	
is	 that	 the	 short	 term	 monopolies	 which	 are	 created	 by	
innovation	and	patents	may	become	long	term	in	network	
industries.
a new function of an increasing reLevance: 






Well-enforced	 patents	 raise	 the	 bargaining	 power	 of	
small	 firms	 that	 develop	 and	 supply	 technological	 solu-
tions.	Assimetry	in	size	and	bargaining	power	are	common	
in	 transactions	 between	 small	 technology	 specialists	 and	
downstream	 product	 developers.	 Problems	 arise	 because	
the	small	technology	suppliers	have	no	means	to	appropri-
ate	the	rents	from	their	innovations	other	than	a	legal	stake	
on	 these	 innovations.	Weak	or	no	patent	would	have	 two	




because	 either	 the	 small	 company	 becomes	 an	 integrated	




















R&D	efficiency	 by	 fostering	 the	 emergence	 and	 entry	 of	
specialized	technology-services	or	research	firms.
summary on costs, benefits and reaL effects
The	main	effect	is	that	patent	creates	an	incentive	for	R&D;	
this	is	for	that	purpose	that	it	has	been	“invented”.	However,	




increase	 in	 the	 quantity	 of	 resources	 allocated	 to	 innova-
tive	 activities.	The	mixed	 evidence	means	 also	 that	 there	
are	 strong	 variations	 across	 sectors:	 patents	may	 provide	
incentives	for	innovation	in	certain	industries;	but	in	most	
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Many	of	 the	 problems	 caused	 by	 patents	 are	 because	
patents	 are	 poorly	 written,	 inlegalese,	 to	 claim	 as	 much	
while	disclosing	as	little.




the	 usefulness	 and	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 patent	 system	 as	
a	mean	 to	 appropriate	 innovation	 benefits,	we	 see	 strong	
variations	ranging	from	the	case	of	pharmaceuticals	using	
the	system	in	a	very	enthusiastic	way	to	a	more	qualified	
appreciation	 in	 biotechnology,	 to	 the	mixed	 views	 of	 the	
computer	 and	 semi-conductor	 industries	 to	 the	 somewhat	
negative	views	of	software	developers	and	Internet	services.	




























innovation	 and	 cumulativeness;	 public	 good	 characteris-
tics;	 network	 characteristics;	 transaction	 costs.	One	obvi-
ous	response	to	these	variations	from	sector	to	sector	is	to	
explicitly	 legislate	 different	 patent	 standard	 for	 different	
industries	 to	 supplement	 patent	 protection	 in	 some	 fields	
with	a	suis generis	status.	The	economic	effects	of	patents	
are	quite	 different	 in	 software	 and	biotechnology;	 two	of	




…which wiLL put the entire system at risk
However,	 it	 is	 relatively	 easy	 to	 argue	 that	 some	 kind	 of	
fine	 tuning	 according	 to	 technological	 heterogeneity	will	








–	 in	practice	–	 such	efforts	would	 fail.	Drafters	of	patent	
application	will	always	be	more	ingenious	than	the	writers	
of	patent	rules.	So	prescribing	patent	protection	for	certain	
technologies	 will	 simply	 drive	 applications	 to	 be	written	
so	that	they	appear	in	other,	more	favourable,	classes.	Also	
such	 a	 policy	 process	 toward	 more	 technology	 specific	










patent	offices	and	authorities	 is	 to	 learn	how	to	use	 these	
policy	levers	and	to	be	incentivized	to	do	so.




industries	 differently	 and	 those	 that	 treat	 different	 inven-
tions	differently	without	explicit	 regard	 to	 industries.	The	
exclusion	 of	 abstract	 ideas	 from	 patentability	 or	 the	 use	
of	 the	utility	doctrine	 in	 the	US	are	examples	of	existing	
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As	 a	 conclusion	 the	 problem	 is	where	 insights	 about	
innovation	economics	should	be	built	into	the	system,	since	
understanding	 what	 policy	 lever	 should	 be	 used	 in	 what	
circumstances	 is	about	economics	of	 innovation.	There	 is	









Conclusion: Patent and the search for the design 
of “superior” solutions to support knowledge 
access and production
How	the	knowledge	trade	off	should	be	solved	(and	so	what	
kind	 of	 mechanism	 should	 be	 used)	 depends	 obviously	
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